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Abstract The aim of this study was to see if and how the intensity of depression correlates
with the cognitive representation of notions, and if any influence is reversed during remission.
The cognitive representation indices used were the valence and number of metaphors pro-
duced for a notion. Three adult groups took part: persons with depression (n = 30), persons
in remission (n = 12), and a control group (n = 30). Five notions were considered: PAST,
FUTURE, JOY, SADNESS, and HAPPINESS. The Questionnaire of the Metaphorical Con-
ceptualization of a Notion was used. The results showed that (a) depressive subjects did not
have problems with metaphorical processing, (b) depressive subjects demonstrated strong
interpretational negativism, (c) subjects during remission did not present distorted concep-
tual processing. The results are discussed in the context of theories of automatic metaphor
processing, and conceptions of cognitive depressive distortions, in tasks requiring effort and
substantial involvement of cognitive resources.
Keywords Depression · Metaphor · Valence · Notions · Concepts
Introduction
Cognitive Disturbances in Depression Possibly Affecting the Comprehension of Notions
Depression is a disease involving low mood and changes in emotional reactivity, as well as
integral disturbances in cognitive functioning (cf. the diagnostic standards ICD-10, Puz˙yn´ski
and Wciórka 1997; and DSM-IV, APA 1994). The literature describes a number of dis-
turbances of cognitive function in depression (for a brief review, see Talarowska et al.
2009), including executive dysfunction (e.g., Holmes and Pizzagalli 2007), memory deficits
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(including those affecting short- and long-term memory, outlined e.g., in Georgieff et al.
1998; working memory, e.g., Fossati et al. 1999; von Hecker and Se˛dek 1999; autobiograph-
ical memory: for a review, see Williams et al. 2007), problems with concentration (e.g., von
Hecker and Meiser 2005), and problems with complex problem solving (cf. e.g., Se˛dek et
al. 2010). Herein is a more detailed discussion on attention and memory dysfunction, both
related to depression, since these aspects of cognitive functioning seem particularly important
in the metaphorical processing of notions. Throughout this paper, notions (in the sense of
individuals’ concepts) are understood as mental representations of elements of the external
or inner reality. Thus notions are “concepts in use”.
Based on an overview of contemporary research on the underlying causes of cognitive
deficits in depressive subjects, one could conclude that attention function is a key area of
cognitive functioning, subject to distortion in connection with depression. There is evidence
that people suffering from depression devote too much of their cognitive resources to process-
ing information related to their own mistakes and depressive mood (see e.g., Stordal et al.
2004; Dalgleish et al. 2007, cited in Piotrowski and Wierzchon´ 2009), or—more generally—
information unimportant to the task in hand (e.g., von Hecker and Meiser 2005), making them
unable to perform a cognitive task properly. Recent research results confirm the content-
specificity hypothesis (Beck 1976) offered as part of Beck’s theory of depression (1963,
1967), one of the best-known, and empirically most often confirmed, theories of depression
(cf. Solomon and Haaga 2005). This hypothesis states that negative stimuli (verbal or non-
verbal) strongly attract the attention of depressive subjects (there are numerous examples of
empirical confirmation, e.g., Blaut 2003; Lamberton and Oei 2008; for a review, see e.g.,
Gotlib and Neubauer 2000). Furthermore, people with depression interpret neutral stimuli as
negative more often than healthy people (cf. e.g., the research of Gollan et al. 2008, on the
interpretation of facial expressions by depressive individuals). One recent explanation for
such a negativity bias in depression claims that it has complicated origins and is the effect
of a distorted bottom-up mechanism of emotional content processing, as well as weakened
top-down cognitive control over affective interference (see Fales et al. 2008, for fMRI studies
using tasks involving evaluation of affectively marked stimuli). (An exhaustive overview of
concepts explaining the mechanism by which serious depression influences the way attention
focuses on affective stimuli can be found in Bylsma et al. 2008.)
Memory is another area of cognitive deficits in depression, well documented by empirical
research. General memory impairment has even been included in the diagnostic standards for
major depression proposed by the DSM-IV manual of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA 1994, p. 322). Specific biases of memory in depression are also mentioned, such
as better memory retention of negative information related to depression (cf. the theory
of negative cognitive patterns of Beck 1976; for an overview of depression-related memory
deficits, see e.g., Ellwart et al. 2003). It is considered that performance in memory tasks can be
treated as a predictor of difficulties associated with emerging out of depression (in particular,
this applies to remembering specific episodes from the past, see Brittlebank et al. 1993, as
cited in McNally 2006). One currently prominent trend in research on distorted memory
function in people with depression involves studies on working memory. The results of many
empirical studies suggest the existence of working memory deficits in people suffering from
depression (e.g., Fossati et al. 1999; von Hecker and Se˛dek 1999).
Difficulties with attention and memory function in depressive subjects are sometimes
connected with ruminations (Joormann and Gotlib 2008, cf. also Levens et al. 2009), that
is, automatic and uncontrolled negative thoughts about oneself, the world, and the future,
typical of depression (Joormann and Gotlib 2008). One explanation for rumination states that
a negative mood activates matching representations. Due to their poorer executive functions
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(especially inhibition), people with depression are unable to refresh representations in their
working memory effectively (e.g., Friedman and Miyake 2004, as cited in Joormann and
Gotlib 2008), and therefore find it difficult to replace negative representations with positive
ones (that would improve their mood), thus falling into a vicious circle of ruminative thoughts
(for an alternative explanation, see e.g., Levens et al. 2009; for research on the impact of
rumination on cognitive functioning in depression, see e.g., Joormann and Gotlib 2008;
Levens et al. 2009; Watkins and Brown 2002).
It is worth noting that the general conclusion that attention dysfunctions and memory
deficits in depressive subjects make performing cognitive tasks difficult would be an over-
simplification. Contemporary literature on the cognitive functioning of depressive subjects
includes numerous reports on cognitive tasks performed by this group, but the results of meta-
analyses suggest that the results of these studies are often inconsistent. von Hecker and Se˛dek
(1999) pointed to the interesting observation that people suffering from depression perform
some cognitive tasks well, while doing much worse in other, seemingly similar, tasks. For
example, depressive subjects have problems with processing moderately structured materials,
but none with low or highly structured materials (reviewed in von Hecker and Se˛dek 1999).
Other studies have shown no increased sensitivity of depressed subjects to all negatively
marked words, though they were observed to be more susceptible when socially threatening
words were involved (Mathews et al. 1996, as cited in Taylor and John 2004). Inconsis-
tent results are also provided by reports on the memory function of people with depression.
Though many reports show the existence of general memory deficits in depressive subjects,
others do not confirm any overall deterioration of memory, only confirming the existence of
specific deficits, limited to specific tasks (for a review, see e.g., Ellwart et al. 2003). For exam-
ple, Watkins and associates (Watkins et al. 2000) showed that depressive subjects remember
negative words better than positive ones, but only in conceptually controlled tests, not in
perceptually controlled ones.
One possible interpretation is that depression primarily affects effortful, elaborative
processing, and not automatic, pre-attentive processes (cf. the “integrated theory” of Williams
et al. 1997, as cited in Ellwart et al. 2003). This approach seems to be confirmed by recent
reports on the memory function of depressive subjects. For example, in the studies of
Ellwart and associates (2003; cf. also Taylor and John 2004), depressive subjects did not
show deficits of implicit memory, but only of explicit memory, and only after cognitive inter-
ference between the phases of learning and recall. This was interpreted as evidence that the
functioning of people with depression is not disturbed during the basic direct processing
of information, and that problems arise only when an additional burden is placed on the
cognitive system (cf. the theory of Kofta and Se˛dek 1998).
An interesting rationalization of cognitive deficits linked to depression was proposed by
Se˛dek, Brzezicka, and von Hecker (described in Se˛dek et al. 2010). Their cognitive exhaustion
model (e.g., Se˛dek et al. 1993, as reviewed in Se˛dek et al. 2010) explains why poorer function
occurs during processing of complex information, and links cognitive function disturbances
(in particular, those observed in depressive subjects) to failure to produce mental models (cf.
Johnson-Laird 1983). Their theory assumes that people performing a complicated task try
to extract important information from among unimportant stimuli, and to grasp the essence
of the problem. In a controlled situation, they most often manage to create integrated mental
representations of the problem, which helps them perform the task effectively. However, when
there is no perceived control (e.g., in unsolvable problems), the efforts to create a general
model are unproductive, and lead to no progress in task performance, while at the same
time depleting the individual’s cognitive resources. According to the authors in question,
this approach can be used successfully to explain cognitive deficits in depression. Due to
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ruminations and painful experience from the past, people with depression expect lack of
control. They expect an unsolvable situation, leading to uncertainty. This, in turn, impairs
their integration processes, their ability to produce mental models of complex problems,
but without weakening their functioning in tasks requiring simple information processing or
simple decisions (for a review, see Se˛dek et al. 2010). The expectations stemming from the
cognitive exhaustion model have found empirical confirmation in studies involving depressive
and non-depressive subjects (e.g., von Hecker and Se˛dek 1999; Se˛dek and von Hecker 2004).
The existence of cognitive changes in depression is well established. However, results
are contradictory as concerns what happens during remission from depression. Older studies
suggest that depression-related cognitive changes fade away during remission (e.g., Barnett
and Gotlib 1988, as cited in Ilardi and Craighead 1999). More recent studies suggest that
even people cured of depression manifest a special model of information processing (Atchley
et al. 2007). For example, results showing that subjects after a 6-month remission from
depression perform worse on tasks involving verbal memory and verbal fluency, compared
to subjects who have never had depression (Neu et al. 2005; Biringer et al. 2005; as cited
in Talarowska et al. 2009); nor was improvement observed in episodic memory (studies of
Airaksinen and associates 2006, as cited in Talarowska et al. 2009). Williams et al. (2007)
reviewed research on excessive generalization of memory in affective disorders, and reported
that this feature of memory function persisted even in individuals who had experienced an
episode of mood disturbance once, even if their mood at the time they were studied was not
disturbed. Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) reported on executive function deficits observed after
depression symptoms had disappeared. Recently, it has even been suggested that cognitive
susceptibility to depression may be genetically conditioned and could manifest itself in early
childhood (see Hayden et al. 2008).
Studies on the Comprehension of Notions by Subjects Suffering from Depression
Insofar as we are aware, the problem of conceptual process disturbances in depression is
seldom undertaken in contemporary publications. Among recent studies it is hard to find
projects that specifically study the comprehension of notions (e.g., temporal notions and
names of emotions related to symptoms of depression) in depressive subjects. Though there
are some studies comparing the perception of time by patients suffering from depression and
healthy subjects (e.g., Mahlberg et al. 2008; Gil and Droit-Volet 2009; Sévigny et al. 2003),
they are not concerned with comprehension of notions related to time, but only with time
perception.
One promising method of studying the cognitive representations of selected notions in
depressive subjects seems to be the analysis of the metaphorical conceptualization of these
notions. It turns out that processing of metaphorical content is controlled by cognitive func-
tions similar to those that are disturbed when the disease intensifies (especially working
memory, cf. “Cognitive Disturbances in Depression Possibly Affecting the Comprehension
of Notions”, “Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Premises for Studying Metaphorical Con-
ceptualizations Produced by Depression Sufferers” sections.). This may indicate that there
are differences in the metaphorical conceptualizations produced by healthy people and by
patients suffering from depression.
Studies on how people suffering from various mental disorders process metaphorical con-
tent is currently a strongly developing trend in the psychological and psychiatric literature.
Recent publications describe disturbances in the processing of metaphorical content in dif-
ferent mental and neurological diseases, including schizophrenia (e.g., Langdon et al. 2002,
as cited in Rapp et al. 2007; Sponheim et al. 2003, cited in Argyris et al. 2007), Alzheimer’s
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disease (e.g., Papagno et al. 2003; cited in Argyris et al. 2007), Asperger syndrome (see
Rapp et al. 2004), autism (e.g., Seitz 1996, as cited in Seitz 2005), and alexithymia (see Seitz
2005). To our knowledge, however, there is a lack of research on how people suffering from
depression process metaphorical stimuli.
Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Premises for Studying Metaphorical Conceptualizations
Produced by Depression Sufferers
To study depression-related cognitive disturbances affecting the level of notions, we had
to adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical framework, one that would include not only psy-
chopathological theories, but also psycholinguistic and linguistic perspectives and methods.
In its broad sense, the topic discussed here is linked with the relation between language
and cognition, a problem that has been investigated for over half a century within cogni-
tive psychology (Whorf 1956 vs. Fodor 1975; Kay and McDaniel 1978; Pinker 1994 for
the cognition–language relation in the light of present-day opinions, see e.g., Vigliocco and
Kleiner 2004; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi 2011; for the role of cognition in selected linguistic theo-
ries, see e.g., Butler 2008; for a review, see e.g., Bartczak 2009). In a narrower approach, the
study of the metaphorical conceptualizations of notions requires dealing with the very vague
and fuzzy definition of metaphor (for a review of theories and definitions of metaphorical
language, see e.g., Bartczak 2009). When studying cognitive distortions at the notion level,
observed in various mental disorders (whose etiology is often interpreted as the effect of
disturbances in brain function), including depression, it seems appropriate to turn to neu-
ropsychological theories of metaphor comprehension (e.g., Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005; see
also Feldman 2006; Gibbs 2006). This approach is well represented by contemporary psy-
cholinguistic theories on metaphorical language processing, in a trend to integrate linguistics
with neuronal theories (Kravchenko 2006; cf. e.g., the neural theory of language, Feldman
and Narayanan 2004; the network model of human language, Markošová 2008). Gener-
ally, neuropsychological theories of metaphor, which invoke neuropsychological arguments
based on classical connectionist theories (Hebb 1949; Hayek 1952), assume that metaphor-
ical thinking is primary. Put more simply, the main idea of neuropsychological theories of
metaphor is that metaphorical thinking is conditioned by the architecture of the human brain
(cf. e.g., Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005). Metaphors are described not as figures of speech, but
as neuron maps connecting the network of the metaphorical vehicle with the network of the
metaphor’s topic, e.g., the network of JOURNEY with the network of LOVE in the case of
the well-known metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. As metaphorical content is processed, an
integrated circuit is immediately created in which both the vehicle and the topic are processed
simultaneously (cf. Tendahl and Gibbs Jr. 2008). In the light of neuropsychological theories,
the importance of metaphor for human cognition is explained with reference to the specificity
of learning processes. Connectionist theories describe them as the creation, strengthening,
or modification of synaptic connections on the basis of repetitive stimulation (the weak-
ening of relations takes place in a similar way). Knowledge is gathered most rapidly and
efficiently if the absorption of information requires minimal, and not substantial, changes
in the network of connections (Goldbaum 2001, as cited in Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005).
Thus, by enabling more complicated experiences to be expressed in terms of simpler and
more basic ones, metaphor becomes the fundamental tool of cognition. In recent years there
has been a marked increase in research on metaphor comprehension using neuroimaging
methods (one of the earliest is that of Bottini et al. 1994; for studies on the processing of
metaphorical word pairs, see e.g., Lee and Dapretto 2006; Mashal et al. 2007; for research on
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metaphorical sentences, see e.g., Eviatar and Just 2006; Rapp et al. 2007; Argyris et al. 2007).
The results most often show that metaphors are processed through a special neuronal mech-
anism (for studies with the use of fMRI, see e.g., Shibata et al. 2007). There is also evidence
that different kinds of metaphorical mappings reflect different specific brain networks (cf.
e.g., the basic metaphor theory; Seitz 2005).
Regardless of which definition of metaphor is chosen, studying the metaphorical conceptu-
alization of notions in people suffering from depression, and in healthy subjects, necessitates
the assumption of inter-individual variability in metaphorical processing. Although recent
years have seen many cases proving that individual differences could serve as performance
predictors for many language tasks (for a review, see Blasko 1999), the hypothesis that
selected qualities of the subject affect the processing of metaphorical content has hitherto
seen little empirical verification (cf. the discussion in Blasko 1999). Much greater interest has
been shown in the influence of selected qualities of metaphors themselves (e.g., familiarity,
accuracy, etc.) on the process of their comprehension (for an overview, see e.g., Bartczak
2009). It is still not clear what particular variables from the group of individual differences
would cause differences in metaphorical content processing. It seems unlikely that these are
cultural or inter-linguistic differences (the results of neuropsychological studies involving
subjects speaking English, German, Mandarin Chinese, and Japanese have been reported by
Shibata et al. 2007). The more probable track could be individual differences in working
memory capacity and executive function capabilities.
One example of a theoretical model predicting how working memory affects metaphor
processing is Kintsch’s predication model (Kintsch 2000, 2001). This model presents the
understanding of metaphorical expressions as a process of spreading activation in a self-
inhibiting semantic network consisting of the predicate P , argument A (or the vehicle and
topic of the metaphor), and their n closest neighbors. Kintsch’s model assumes that individual
differences in working memory capacity, and in executive function (particularly inhibition
processes), will affect the processing of metaphorical utterances. Someone with working
memory deficits (a) may not have sufficient resources to activate an adequately extensive
semantic network and (b) will do worse at inhibiting distinctive but irrelevant qualities of the
predicate, which usually leads such a person to provide an interpretation of metaphorical con-
tent more slowly, and this interpretation tends to be of poorer quality (cf. also Blasko 1999;
Gernsbacher et al. 2001). An example of a different approach to explain differences in perfor-
mance of tasks requiring metaphor processing, in terms of working memory, is the capacity
theory of language (Just and Carpenter 1992). In this theory, working memory is thought
to affect both the speed and effectiveness of metaphorical content comprehension. The role
of working memory in metaphor processing can also be approached through Glucksberg’s
class-inclusion model (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001, 2003). This model
assumes that metaphors are understood as category statements. For example, the metaphor
Cigarettes are time bombs categorizes the topic of the metaphor (cigarettes) as belonging to
the category—formed ad hoc—of “objects that are deadly over time,” a typical representative
being the metaphor’s vehicle (a time bomb). This superordinate ad hoc category is activated
in the metaphor comprehension process, enabling the subject to provide the correct inter-
pretation of the metaphorical meaning. Note that the class-inclusion model, like Kintsch’s
model, emphasizes the important role of working memory mechanisms in the correct inter-
pretation of metaphorical statements. Creating an ad hoc category appropriate to the given
context requires highlighting those qualities of the vehicle that are key to the metaphor’s
meaning (e.g., being dangerous to health and life) and inhibiting those that fit in with the
basic category, but are irrelevant for the meaning of the metaphor (e.g., a terrorist tool). The
role of these mechanisms (also known as enhancement and suppression effects), especially
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the inhibition mechanism, has been confirmed by studies such as those of Gernsbacher et al.
(2001).
The prediction stemming from the foregoing theoretical models, ascribing major impor-
tance to working memory in metaphor processing, has been confirmed empirically by Chiappe
and Chiappe (2007) on the comprehension and production of metaphors by healthy adults.
Working memory was found to affect the processing of metaphorical content, irrespective of
a person’s vocabulary and reading level. The influence of working memory on the assessment
and interpretation of metaphors has also been confirmed by Blasko and Trich (1997, cited
in Blasko 1999). The subjects in their study were given a pretest (the reading span task,
Daneman and Carpenter 1980, as cited in Blasko 1999) and divided into low, medium, and
high working memory span groups. They were then asked to read some stimulus metaphors
and to interpret them in their own words. An evaluation of the subject’s interpretation of
these metaphors, performed by competent raters using a 7-point scale, showed that the best
(most exhaustive and in-depth) interpretations were provided by subjects with the greatest
working memory span. Similar conclusions were drawn in a recent study on metaphorical
language comprehension in subjects with Parkinson’s disease (Monetta and Pell 2007). This
study, which used the metaphor comprehension task (Gernsbacher et al. 2001), showed that
only subjects with working memory deficits did worse in metaphor processing tasks.
Taking into account the results of empirical studies outlined above, and the fact that
memory deficits are present in patients with depression, one can expect differences between
healthy and depressive subjects in performance of tasks involving metaphorical stimuli.
However, according to our knowledge, this problem has not yet been considered in the
contemporary literature yet.
A Study on the Metaphorical Conceptualizations of PAST, FUTURE, JOY,
SADNESS, and HAPPINESS in Depressive and Non-depressive Subjects
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Considering (a) the lack of research on the notion level of cognitive distortions in people
suffering from depression, (b) unresolved discussions on how cognitive changes persist dur-
ing remission from depression, (c) the similarity between the cognitive functions responsible
for metaphorical language processing and those that are disturbed in depressive subjects,
(d) the need to investigate aspects as not yet included in research on metaphor (inter-individual
differences in processing of metaphorical stimuli, with a special focus on the low mood vari-
able; the metaphor valence dimension), and (e) the success of previous research on metaphor
processing by patients suffering from different mental disorders, the following questions are
posed:
1. Is depression correlated with changes in the cognitive representation of notions (as indi-
cated by the valence and number of metaphorical conceptualizations)?
2. Do depressive changes in the cognitive representation of notions recede during remission
from the disease?
Based on:
(a) theoretical premises (including the cognitive theory of depression, Beck 1963, 1967,
especially the content-specificity hypothesis, Beck 1976; the neuropsychological theory
of metaphor, e.g., Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005; the predication model, Kintsch 2000,
2001);
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(b) the results of research on metaphor processing, suggesting that proper comprehension
and production of metaphorical expressions requires an efficient working memory mech-
anism (e.g., Chiappe and Chiappe 2007; Monetta and Pell 2007);
(c) the results of research on the cognitive function of depressive subjects, suggesting work-
ing memory impairment and changed attention function during depression (e.g., Fossati
et al. 1999; von Hecker and Se˛dek 1999; von Hecker and Meiser 2005);
(d) results suggesting that even subjects cured of depression manifest a specific informa-
tion processing pattern (e.g., Atchley et al. 2007; cf. also the overview in Holmes and
Pizzagalli 2007; Talarowska et al. 2009);
the following hypotheses are proposed:
1. Depression is correlated with changes in the cognitive representation of notions, in par-
ticular:
(a) Depressive subjects produce fewer metaphors of a given notion than healthy people;
(b) Depressive subjects produce relatively more metaphors of notions with a negative
valence than healthy people;
(c) Compared to the cognitive representations of notions produced by healthy people,
the cognitive representations of neutral and positive notions produced by depressive
subjects will have a more negative valence, and the cognitive representations of
negative notions—a more positive valence;
2. A depressive pattern of cognitive representation is also observable during remission of
the disorder (cf. e.g., Atchley et al. 2007; and the review in Holmes and Pizzagalli 2007).
Selection of Notions for Analysis
The choice of notions for this study was based on the theoretical characterization of depressive
disorders. Two temporal notions (PAST and FUTURE) as well as three names of emotions
(JOY, SADNESS, and HAPPINESS) were selected. The reason is that many sources listing
the symptoms of depression use these terms to describe cognitive distortions and affective
disturbances in people with depression. It is believed that depressive people perceive their
past mainly as a source of failure and depict their future in dark colors, while the dominating
mental state of depressive people is sadness, and they are unable to feel joy or to be happy
(e.g., Puz˙yn´ski 2002, p. 360; Rosenhan et al. 2003, p. 272). Because PAST, FUTURE, JOY,
SADNESS, and HAPPINESS are notions used to describe cognitive and affective distur-
bances linked to depression, it may be suspected that their cognitive representations could
be different in healthy and depressed subjects.
Methods
Participants
This study was conducted from June to December 2010 and involved three groups of adults.
The first (experimental group, E) comprised 30 subjects suffering from depression (24
women, 6 men; Mage = 44.3, range 21–77)—patients of psychiatric wards and outpatient
clinics in Warsaw hospitals (Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology and Wolski Hospital)
with a diagnosis of F32.1 and F33.1 according to ICD-10 criteria (Puz˙yn´ski and Wciórka
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Table 1 Demographics of the
three participant groups
E = experimental group
(subjects suffering from
depression); C = control group
(subjects who have never suffered
from depression); R = remission
group (patients who had a
depressive episode in the past but
are currently in remission).
a Population
Group E Group C Group R
n 30 30 12











Women 24 24 9
Men 6 6 3
Education
Higher education 13 6 7
Baccalaureate 17 24 5
Place of residence
Country 3 2 2
Town:a up to 20,000 2 2 0
20,000–49,999 1 0 0
50,000–99,999 1 2 0
100,000–499,999 2 2 0
500,000 and more 21 22 10
1997).1 The second (control group, C) comprised 30 subjects who had never suffered from
depression (24 women, 6 men; Mage = 44.6, range 23–83)—medical and non-medical staff
of the institutions concerned. The third (remission group, R) were patients from outpatient
clinics who had had a depressive episode and were in remission (with a diagnosis of F33.4
or F32 in their medical history based on ICD-102). As far as we know, they received similar
kinds of treatment: They had just stopped, or were in the course of gradual discontinuation
of, antidepressants. The third group was the smallest and included 12 subjects (9 women, 3
men; Mage = 49.1, range 23–78). In the study’s 6 months it proved impossible to reach a
larger number of people meeting the criteria for group R (no symptoms of depression at the
time of the study, a depressive episode in the past). The demographics for the three participant
groups are presented in Table 1.
The selection of subjects for groups E and R was made in cooperation with four psychi-
atrists, who singled out patients with the required diagnosis and asked for their consent to
take part in a study on notions. The criterion for assigning the subjects to a given group was
the medical diagnosis based on an in-depth interview and taking into account their result in
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck 1973; Beck and Beamesderfer 1974; Beck et al.
1987; cf. also Parnowski and Jenajczyk 1977). As with other studies involving depressive
subjects, it was agreed that an individual suffered from depression if their result was equal
to or higher than 10 (Beck et al. 1987; Ruscio and Ruscio 2002; see also Fajkowska and
Marszał-Wis´niewska 2006). The average BDI value in group E was 25.95 (range 18–48),
1 F32.1—moderate depressive episode. F33.1—recurrent depressive disorder, current episode moderate.
2 F33.4—recurrent depressive disorder, currently in remission. F32—depressive episode. The research tools
also included the Unfinished Metaphorical Sentences Test, a test of association (cf. Bartczak et al. 2010) and
the Semantic Distance Task (see Bartczak and Bokus 2013). For a presentation of the results obtained using
these tools, see Bartczak 2011b.
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strongly distinguishing it from the other two groups: In groups C and R the average BDI
values were similar, BDI = 5.0 (range 0–9) and BDI = 5.25 (range 1–9), respectively.
Materials
Among other things, the subjects filled in the Questionnaire of the Metaphorical Conceptu-
alization of a Notion (QMCN; cf. Bartczak 2009b)3. The QMCN comprised 60 sentences
related to the past, future, joy, sadness, and happiness (12 per notion). The subject’s task was
to “read the sentences and then assess how accurately they describe the notions of past, future,
joy, sadness, and happiness.” The subjects made their assessment on a 5-point relevance scale
(from 1—very inaccurate sentence, to 5—very accurate sentence).
Metaphoricity, Valence, and Conventionalization Ratings
The QMCN is a tool with a solid empirical foundation. The sentences were taken from nar-
ratives written by depressive (EP; n = 10) and non-depressive (CP; n = 10) adults during
a pilot study conducted in 2007 and 2008. The subjects were asked to write short stories on
the topics: The Past, The Future, Joy, Sadness, and Happiness (for detailed information on
the tools, procedure, and results, see Bartczak 2008). Sentences about the respective notions
were taken from these stories. The selected sentences were then given to competent raters for
assessment. The valence and conventionalization of the sentences was judged by 25 students
from the University of Warsaw’s Institute of Applied Linguistics (20 women and 5 men aged
19–22, Mage = 19.2). They were asked to read each sentence and to decide if its meaning
is positive, neutral, or negative (assessment of valence), and to assess how often this type of
sentence appears in everyday speech (assessment of conventionalization). The judges marked
their replies on two 5-point scales: the valence scale (from 1—strongly negative sentence,
to 5—strongly positive sentence) and the conventionalization scale (from 1—sentence very
seldom found in everyday speech, to 5—sentence very often found in everyday speech). Sixty
items were chosen for the QMCN (12 for each notion), including 34 statements by depressive
patients and 26 by healthy people. The sentences included in the QMCN were those with the
lowest and highest marks on the valence and conventionalization scales (for examples, see
“Appendix”, Table 2). When the judges’ average marks were the same for two or more items,
the lower standard deviation was taken into account. In the next stage, the 60 items selected
for the QMCN were assessed for their metaphoricity by a different group of competent raters.
These were 40 students from a psycholinguistics course at the University of Warsaw’s Faculty
of Psychology, 33 women and 7 men (Mage = 20.92, range 19–26). The judges were asked
to read the sentences and then to “decide if they are metaphorical or not.” The instruction told
them to treat as metaphorical those statements in which the meaning is more concrete than
the original notion (examples from the instruction: very metaphorical, concrete usages: The
past is a little girl in a blue dress; Happiness tastes like hot chocolate; very non-metaphorical,
abstract usages: The past is an unknown; Sadness is a negative emotion). The judges marked
their replies on a 5-point scale (from 1—very non-metaphorical, abstract meaning, to
5—very metaphorical, concrete meaning). Examples of QMCN items with their marks on
the metaphor scale are shown in Appendix Table 3.
3 The research tools also included the Unfinished Metaphorical Sentences Test, a test of association (cf.
Bartczak et al. 2010) and the Semantic Distance Task (Bartczak and Bokus 2013). For a presentation of the
results obtained using these tools, see Bartczak (2011b).
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The sentences were placed in the questionnaire in random order. The QMCN’s reliability
is high: Cronbach’s alpha for the whole questionnaire is .787, and for the individual subscales:
.720 (metaphoricity), .796 (valence), and .730 (conventionalization).
Procedure
All procedures were carried out according to the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved
by the ethical committee of the University of Warsaw’s Faculty of Psychology. Participants
were tested individually. The subjects were asked for their consent to take part in a research
project on the comprehension of notions. Upon giving their consent, they received forms with
the tools and instructions, together with a token gift in the form of a pen with the University
of Warsaw logo. Due to depressive patients’ greater tendency to tire easily, the instructions
offered the possibility of taking a break if the subject felt tired, and then to continue at a later
time. The subjects filled in the questionnaire at home and brought it with them on their next
visit. It took them about 45 min to fill in the questionnaire. The managers of the units where
the study was conducted agreed to their patients’ and employees’ participation in the project.
Depressive patients were chosen for the study in collaboration with the psychiatrists treating
them; participation in the project did not interfere with the patients’ therapy.
Data Analysis
Independent-measures t tests were used to examine the existence of significant inter-group
differences. The normality of the distributions was checked using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test. Each dimension (metaphoricity, valence, conventionality) was analyzed separately.
Regarding the metaphoricity dimension, from among the 60 sentences in the tool, the items
which the judges had given marks well over the average on the metaphoricity scale (2.9 or
more on the 5-point scale) were recognized as metaphorical. This criterion was fulfilled by a
total of 25 items, five each for PAST and FUTURE, three for JOY, eight for SADNESS and
four for HAPPINESS.
Similarly, positive valence was given to those sentences that the judges had given clearly
higher than average marks on the valence scale (2.9 and more). This condition was fulfilled
by 31 of the 60 items on the QMCN, including five for PAST, six for FUTURE, seven for
JOY, four for SADNESS, and nine for HAPPINESS.
Finally, regarding the conventionality dimension, the sentences recognized as conven-
tional were those which the competent judges had assessed clearly above average on the
conventionalization scale (2.9 or more on the 5-point scale), similarly to the choice of items
with high metaphoricity and high valence. This criterion was met by just over half of all the
items on the QMCN (36 out of 60), including seven sentences each for PAST and JOY, nine
each for FUTURE and HAPPINESS, and four for SADNESS.
We calculated the QMCN scores as follows: In the case of PAST and the metaphoric-
ity dimension, five QMCN sentences had been found highly metaphorical. The participant
rated each sentence on the 5-point accuracy scale (i.e., each of the five sentences could be
rated at least 1 and maximally 5). All the ratings given were added up, so that regarding
the PAST and the metaphoricity dimension, it was possible to receive ratings from 5 to 25.
Similarly, in the case of SADNESS and the conventionality dimension, the ratings could
develop from 4 to 20 (because four sentences for SADNESS had been found highly conven-
tional). The scores were calculated in the same way for all three dimensions and all of the
notions.
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Results
Results for Metaphoricity: Checking Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Hypotheses 1a and 1b stated that (a) depressive subjects would produce fewer metaphors of
a given notion than healthy people and that (b) depressive subjects would produce relatively
more metaphors of notions with a negative valence than healthy people. Taking into account
the features of the QMCN, the metaphor production variable in our study is operationalized
as the rating of metaphorical sentence accuracy.
Contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 1a (which predicted problems with processing
of metaphorical content by depressive subjects), metaphoricity was not an aspect that strongly
differentiated the replies of the groups in the study. Taking into account all the items of the
QMCN, without splitting them into sentences related to the individual notions, all the groups
more often rated as accurate statements with an average level of metaphoricity (the average
intensity of the “metaphoricity” quality for the 20 items chosen as being the most accurate
by groups E, C, and R was 2.74, 2.42, and 2.38, respectively), and as inaccurate—those with
a higher than average metaphoricity (the average intensity of the quality of “metaphoricity”
for the 20 items chosen as being the least accurate: E: 3.29, C: 3.47, and R: 3.25).
Let us look at the results when the items of the QMCN are split into statements on the
individual notions. An analysis with the t test confirmed the initial observations: Depres-
sion sufferers did not choose metaphorical items as being accurate significantly less often
than subjects from the control group (no confirmation of Hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, in
the case of three notions—PAST, FUTURE, and SADNESS—it turned out that depressive
subjects significantly more often than healthy subjects chose sentences with a high level of
metaphoricity as being accurate. The result for SADNESS, E: M = 24.90, SD = 4.71; C:
M = 18.37, SD = 5.20, t (58) = 5.10, p < .001, confirms Hypothesis 1b and its prediction
of intensified metaphorical processing of negatively marked notions by depressive subjects.
Higher marks for metaphorical sentences regarding PAST and FUTURE given by the experi-
mental group; PAST—E: M = 15.83, SD = 2.70; C: M = 11.83, SD = 2.84, t (58) = 5.58,
p < .001; FUTURE—E: M = 16.10, SD = 1.95; C: M = 14.13, SD = 2.36, t (58) = 3.52,
p < .001; can also be considered as agreeing with the hypothesis, if we assume that these
notions have a negative valence for patients suffering from depression.
In summary, the pattern of results obtained in the QMCN does not confirm Hypothesis 1a
and its prediction of patients with depression having problems with processing metaphorical
content. On the contrary, taking into account the items for all the notions, depressive subjects
chose metaphorical sentences as being accurate significantly more often (M = 81.57, SD =
7.92) than subjects from the control group, M = 69.77, SD = 9.98, t (58) = 5.07, p < .001.
At the same time, the QMCN results provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1b regarding
intensified metaphorical processing of negatively marked notions. The differences between
groups on the metaphoricity scale are shown in Fig. 1.
Results for Valence: Testing Hypothesis 1c
A comparison of the results for the depressive group and the control group brought strong
confirmation of Hypothesis 1c regarding the difference in the valence of the cognitive repre-
sentations produced by depressive and healthy subjects (see Fig. 2). Compared to the control
group, subjects from the experimental group less often chose as accurate the items related
to a neutral notion: FUTURE, E: M = 23.80, SD = 4.04; vs. C: M = 28.67, SD = 3.15,
t (58) = −5.20, p < .001; and to positive notions: JOY, E: M = 29.70, SD = 5.27; vs.
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Fig. 1 Summed averages of metaphorical item ratings in the group of depressive subjects (E), healthy subjects

























Fig. 2 Summed averages of high-valence item ratings in the group of depressive subjects (E), healthy subjects
(C) and subjects in remission (R)
C: M = 32.93, SD = 2.75, t (58) = −2.98, p = .004; and HAPPINESS, E: M = 35.57,
SD = 6.86; vs. C: M = 38.30, SD = 4.99, t (58) = −1.76, p = .04, which had a high
valence. In the case of the negatively marked notion (SADNESS), as expected, the correla-
tion was the opposite. Patients with depression gave significantly higher marks to sentences
with high valence (M = 8.53, SD = 2.57) than subjects from the control group, M = 7.10,
SD = 2.31, t (58) = 2.27, p = .027. The PAST was the only notion for which inter-group
differences did not reach a statistically significant level.
Results for Conventionalization
Apart from the metaphoricity and valence of statements, the QMCN controlled one more
dimension: conventionalization. Many contemporary studies on metaphorical language
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Fig. 3 Summed averages of high-conventionalization item ratings in the group of depressive subjects (E),
healthy subjects (C) and subjects in remission (R)
processing have provided evidence that conventionalization, the frequency with which a
given structure occurs in a language, is one of the factors most strongly affecting metaphor
processing (cf. e.g., Blasko and Connine 1993; Giora et al. 2000; Keysar et al. 2000). Consid-
ering the cognitive distortions occurring in people suffering from depression, and premises
suggesting a difference in the valence of representations produced by depressive and healthy
subjects, one could conclude that depressive subjects would be more likely than subjects
from the control group to choose as accurate those items that have a lower level of conven-
tionalization, and are used less often in speech.
Contrary to expectations, conventionalization did not turn out to be an aspect strongly
differentiating the replies of the groups in the study. Regardless of the group they were from,
subjects more often chose items with a high rather than low conventionalization as being
accurate (the average intensity of the quality of “conventionalization” for the 20 items chosen
as being the most accurate by groups E, C, and R was: 3.71, 3.97, and 3.89, respectively). The
difference in assessment of conventional sentences on SADNESS between groups E and C
was the only significant inter-group difference (cf. Fig. 3). Subjects suffering from depression
assessed these items as being more accurate (M = 15.87, SD = 2.39) than subjects from the
control group, M = 13.73, SD = 1.84, t (58) = 3.88, p < .001. This result contradicts the
expectation that people with depression would choose less conventional items than healthy
people.
Comparing Results of Depressive Subjects and Participants During Remission from
Depression: Checking Hypothesis 2
Analysis of the QMCN results revealed significant differences between the replies of the
experimental and control groups, in terms of both valence and metaphoricity.
Hypothesis 2 assumed that similar differences would be observed between the results of
healthy subjects and those in remission. However, the results ran contrary to expectations. The
assessments of group R differed significantly from those of group E and—in addition—they
were very similar to the assessments of group C. Strikingly, in the case of four out of the five
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notions in the study (PAST, FUTURE, SADNESS, HAPPINESS) it even turned out that four
items chosen as the most accurate were the same in both groups. An analysis of the replies
of all three groups showed that all the observed statistically significant differences between
the results of depressive subjects and those in remission are also observed between the
results of depressive and healthy subjects. This is all the more interesting in that statistically
significant differences between groups E and R concerned exactly the same aspects and
the same notions as the differences between groups E and C. In other words, subjects during
remission from depression replied almost exactly the same as subjects from the control group,
but at the same time significantly differently from patients suffering from depression (results
for metaphoricity—cf. Fig. 1, results for valence—cf. Fig. 2, results for conventionalizatio—
cf. Fig. 3).
Like healthy subjects, members of group R assessed metaphorical sentences as less
accurate (M = 72.00, SD = 6.07) than depressive subjects, M = 81.57, SD = 7.92,
t (40) = 3.76, p < .001. Taking into account individual notions, subjects during remission
from depression, like those from the control group, gave lower marks than depressive subjects
to metaphorical sentences about the FUTURE, E: M = 16.10, SD = 1.95; vs. R: M = 13.50,
SD = 1.62, t (40) = 4.07, p < .001; and SADNESS, E: M = 24.90, SD = 4.71; vs. R:
M = 19.00, SD = 3.19, t (40) = 3.98, p < .001.
For valence, again the replies of group R were similar to those of group C. Subjects in
remission gave higher marks to positive sentences about FUTURE and JOY than depressive
patients, FUTURE—E: M = 23.80, SD = 4.04; vs. R: M = 28.08, SD = 2.02, t (40) =
−3.49, p < .001; JOY—E: M = 29.70, SD = 5.27; vs. R: M = 33.08, SD = 2.19,
t (40) = −2.14, p = .019 (one-tailed). In the case of SADNESS, similarly to the comparison
between the results of groups E and C, an opposite correlation was observed: Members of
group R gave lower marks to positive sentences about SADNESS (M = 7.08, SD = 1.88)
than subjects from group E, M = 8.53, SD = 2.57, t (40) = 1.77, p = .04 (one-tailed).
Analysis of the results for the third dimension—conventionalization—also showed a sim-
ilarity between the replies of groups C and R. Like members of group C, subjects during
remission from depression gave lower marks to conventional sentences about SADNESS
(M = 14.17, SD = 1.19) than depressive patients, M = 15.87, SD = 2.39, t (40) = 2.34,
p = .024.
The following differences between groups E and R did not reach the level of statistical
significance (though these differences were significant in the case of the results for groups
E and C): Differences in assessment of metaphorical sentences about PAST (group R even
gave these items significantly higher marks than group C, cf. E: M = 11.83, SD = 2.84;
vs. R: M = 14.00, SD = 2.58, t (40) = −2.28, p = .028) and differences in assessment of




The overall results definitely did not confirm Hypothesis 1a and its prediction that people
suffering from depression would have problems with processing metaphorical content: All
groups more often chose as accurate those statements that had an average level of metaphoric-
ity. This result can be considered surprising, in as much as earlier research on mechanisms
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of producing and understanding metaphors (e.g., Chiappe and Chiappe 2007; Monetta and
Pell 2007) clearly suggested that working memory capacity was a major factor responsible
for effective processing of metaphorical content, while research on the cognitive function
of people suffering from depression provided evidence of disturbances of that memory in
depressive subjects (e.g., Fossati et al. 1999; von Hecker and Meiser 2005). On the other
hand, this lack of confirmation of Hypothesis 1a provides some interesting theoretical con-
clusions, both for models of metaphorical processing and for concepts explaining cognitive
difficulties observed in patients with depression.
Taking into account theories related to metaphor processing, the result obtained could be
considered as support for theories that promote the automatic, unconscious, and effortless
nature of metaphorical content processing. If we assume that people with depression perform
worse in tasks requiring complex processing of information, while at the same time tests
requiring metaphorical processing (e.g., the QMCN) show no differences in performance
between the depressive and control groups, there is reason to assume that processing of
metaphorical content takes place automatically and without effort. Therefore, the results
obtained here contradict the psychological plausibility of the standard pragmatic model (Grice
1975, reviewed in Blasko 1999), which assumes that metaphor processing requires more effort
than processing of literal statements, because the appropriate non-literal interpretation takes
place only after the contextually inadequate literal interpretation has been discarded. Thus,
the results are compatible with many results of contemporary studies suggesting that the
process of creating and understanding metaphors occurs just as automatically and quickly
as with literal statements (e.g., Gernsbacher et al. 2001; Glucksberg 2003). The conclusions
from the present study are also in agreement with the implications of neuropsychological
theories of metaphor (e.g., Schnitzer and Pedreira 2005) which assume that metaphorical
thinking is natural for human beings and is the result of the way the brain is organized and
functions.
Leaving aside models of metaphor comprehension, the result of the present study is also
interesting from the point of view of theories explaining cognitive deficits in depression.
It seems possible to treat it as an argument in favor of models predicting that depression-
related cognitive deficits will only become apparent during processing that requires effort
(as opposed to automatic and unconscious processes). Note that, in tasks requiring metaphor
comprehension, subjects with depression performed just as well as healthy subjects. Assum-
ing that processing of metaphorical content is automatic and effortless, we find confirmation
of the speculation that the basic level of information processing is not disturbed as a result
of depression, in agreement with the predictions of Williams’ integrated theory (1988, 1997,
as cited in Ellwart et al. 2003). It is also compatible with the concept of Se˛dek and asso-
ciates (2010) explaining depressive cognitive deficits by referring to the cognitive exhaustion
model (Kofta and Se˛dek 1998; Se˛dek and Kofta 1990; Se˛dek et al. 1993; reviewed in Se˛dek
et al. 2010) and anticipating, among other things, that depression reduces the capacity for
creating mental models of complex problems, but without perceptibly affecting the perfor-
mance of tasks requiring automatic information processing. There are also other results of
empirical studies (e.g., Ellwart et al. 2003) confirming the idea that cognitive problems in
depressive subjects appear particularly when additional burdens are placed on the cognitive
system.
Testing Hypothesis 1b
Contrary to Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b has been confirmed by the present results. Com-
pared to healthy people, depressive subjects chose sentences about SADNESS that had a
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high level of metaphoricity as being more accurate than sentences that were more literal.
A similar pattern of results was observed for the temporal notions PAST and FUTURE, in
agreement with Hypothesis 1b if we assume that these notions have negative valence for
people suffering from depression.
The obtained pattern of results can be interpreted in at least two ways. First of all, it can
be treated as confirmation of one of the elements in Beck’s cognitive triad (1963, 1967).
In this concept, the FUTURE, next to the WORLD and the SELF, is the topic area around
which the automatic negative thoughts of patients with depression revolve. A greater number
of metaphorical conceptualizations of the PAST (and FUTURE and SADNESS) could be
evidence that people with depression are more concentrated on topic areas related to these
notions than healthy people. This is in agreement with reports on the topics of depressive
ruminations (cf. Joormann and Gotlib 2008), with the results of studies suggesting excessive
self-absorption of depressive subjects (e.g., Huflejt-Łukasik 2010), and with theories that a
depressive mood inclines individuals to process information that conforms to it (e.g., resource
commitment theories; for a review, see Piotrowski and Wierzchon´ 2009).
An alternative interpretation for the larger number of metaphorical conceptualizations
of PAST, FUTURE, and SADNESS produced by the experimental group can be found in
theories suggesting defocused attention in depressive subjects (see e.g., von Hecker and
Meiser 2005). Let us assume that metaphorical understanding of notions causes activation
of their less prototypical semantic qualities. This is in agreement with the results of studies
suggesting that, compared to healthy people, subjects with depression more often notice
qualities of a stimulus that are irrelevant for the cognitive task in hand (von Hecker and
Meiser 2005). It needs noting, however, that if we accept this interpretation, the question
arises as to why intensified metaphorical processing only occurred for selected notions and
not all of them. Could this feature of cognitive function be activated only for stimuli that
match a depressive mood? The results of studies carried out so far do not confirm such a
correlation.
Testing Hypothesis 1c
Hypothesis 1c, which concerns inter-group differences in the valence of notion representa-
tion, was strongly and unequivocally confirmed by the present results (statistically significant
inter-group differences for FUTURE, JOY, HAPPINESS, and SADNESS). This result can be
regarded as an important contribution to the discussion on the nature of depressive cognition
distortions. First of all, it turns out that the negative cognitive patterns suggested by Beck also
manifest themselves at the notion level. Depression appears to be a negative interpretation
filter placed over thought patterns, as well as processes of comprehending individual notions.
Secondly, the obtained pattern of results could provide inspiration for expanding the scope
of research on cognitive disturbances in depression. To the best of our knowledge, exist-
ing theoretical models have concentrated on distortions in processing stimuli with different
affective characteristics typically associated with depression (cf. review by Bylsma et al.
2008, dividing theoretical proposals into concepts speaking of sensitivity to negative emo-
tional stimuli, including the content-specificity hypothesis of Beck 1976, concepts focusing
on difficulties with reacting to positive stimuli, and theories speaking of insensitivity to all
emotional stimuli in depression). The present study takes a different look at the problem: It
proposes investigating not so much the influence that the valence of the notion itself has on
its ease of processing by a depression sufferer, but the interpretation distortions that emerge
in depressive subjects’ processing of verbal stimuli of different valence.
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One possible explanation for the interpretational negativism observed in the study’s
depressive subjects could be the influence of ruminative thoughts on cognitive processes.
It has been pointed out that they can be activated by a negative mood and persist for a
greater length of time due to depressive subjects’ deficits in refreshing working memory,
amongst other factors (Joormann and Gotlib 2008). It is possible that active negative repre-
sentations, and difficulties with replacing them with positive ones, which would serve mood
improvement, are conducive to negative processing of received stimuli, including verbal
ones. Ruminations about one’s own depressive mood, symptoms, anxieties, and fears favor
assimilation of stimuli in such a way as to make them compatible with the ruminations in
terms of content. The results obtained in the present study would seem to confirm this. The
literature includes research results compatible with this that concern processing of nonverbal
stimuli (cf. e.g., the study of Gollan et al. 2008, on identifying facial expressions).
Testing Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 concerned the persistence of cognitive changes during remission from depres-
sion. In view of the results of many recent studies (e.g., Atchley et al. 2007; Holmes and
Pizzagalli 2007; Watkins et al. 2000: bias in conceptual processing), the pattern of results
for people during remission from depression was expected to be similar in many respects
to those of depressive subjects, even if the typical qualities were less prominent. Contrary
to expectations, people during remission from depression (R) not only did not give similar
replies to subjects with depression (E), but their results were also strikingly similar to those
of the non-depressive control group (C): For four out of the five notions studied (PAST,
FUTURE, SADNESS, HAPPINESS), it even turned out that four items chosen as being the
most accurate were the same in both groups. All the observed statistically significant differ-
ences between groups E and R also occurred between groups E and C, and concerned exactly
the same aspects and the same notions.
Interpreting the results, they do not seem to show the existence of depression-related
cognitive distortions in notion comprehension in the group of subjects during remission
from depression. This result contradicts conclusions suggesting that cognitive changes per-
sist in people who previously had a depressive episode. In view of inconsistent study results
described in the literature, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions. The first interpretation that
comes to mind is that cognitive changes simply recede during remission. Such results have
been reported before (e.g., Barnett and Gotlib 1988; as cited in Ilardi and Craighead 1999).
In fact, subjects in remission did reply very similarly to the control group. Furthermore,
taking valence into account, in a few cases their replies were even more “non-depressive”
(higher valence) than the replies of healthy subjects. This opens up interesting possibilities of
interpretation: Could a depressive episode in the past act as a kind of vaccine, “redirecting”
conceptual mechanisms to non-depressive paths (e.g., by activating positively marked seman-
tic networks)? Such an explanation does not dispel all doubts, however, e.g., how would we
explain a tendency for depression to recur in the future, observed in some patients with a
depressive episode in their case history?
Let us consider a different possibility. One could assume that depression-related cognitive
changes persist (though with reduced intensity) during remission of depression, but not on
the notion comprehension level. This interpretation is exceptionally inspiring, too. Could we
assume, for example, that disturbances at the notion level are typical of full-blown depres-
sion? Verification of this supposition would open up some promising diagnostic possibilities.
However, for valid conclusions to be drawn, more research is definitely needed.
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Limitations of the Study Results
The limitations of the study results are related in particular to the pharmacotherapy of depres-
sive patients and the way in which the group of patients in remission was selected. As a
reminder, members of the experimental group were chosen from among patients of psy-
chiatric wards and outpatient clinics. For obvious reasons, it would have been unethical to
interrupt their pharmacotherapy for the period of the study. It is important to remember that
patients suffering from depression were taking antidepressants. These drugs alleviate the
symptoms of depression, and there is also evidence of their beneficial influence on cognitive
processes (see Talarowska et al. 2009). Therefore we can say with substantial probability
that the drugs the depressive patients were taking could have affected their performance in
the tasks. Perhaps a comparison of the results of healthy subjects and subjects with untreated
depression would have shown greater inter-group differences.
Another major limitation to a generalization of the results is the specificity of the group
of patients during remission of depression (R). When the subjects were being selected for
the study, the conditions for including a person in the group were (a) having had a depressive
episode in the past and (b) the current remission of depression, that is, the lack of depres-
sive symptoms during the study. The indicator of depressive symptoms was, in addition to a
medical diagnosis, the Beck Depression Inventory result. Similarly to other studies involv-
ing depressive subjects (Beck et al. 1987; Ruscio and Ruscio 2002; see also Fajkowska and
Marszał-Wis´niewska 2006), it was accepted that an individual was not currently suffering
from depression if their result was less than 10. This condition made it much harder to find
members for group R. Most of the patients seeing their doctors for checkups, whose case
histories read “recurrent depressive disorder, currently in remission,” achieved BDI results
suggesting a depressive state. In the study’s several months, working with four psychiatrists,
only 12 subjects were found who met the criteria. The question of whether the sample was
representative, whether the members of group R were typical during remission from depres-
sion, remains unanswered. The present study failed to confirm the hypothesis regarding the
persistence of depression-related cognitive distortions in group R. It needs noting, however,
that its members were a precisely selected group, so any generalization of this result should
be offered with caution.
Apart from the pharmacotherapy of depressive patients, and the way in which the group of
patients in remission was selected, two more additional factors have to be considered: the sex
disparity and the broad age range of the participants in the study. As regards the sex disparity,
it needs noting that in all three groups of participants, women significantly outnumbered men:
In Groups E and C, there were 80 % females (n = 24), and in Group R, 67 % females (n = 9,
see Table 1). This could result from the fact that depression is more frequent among women
(cf. Bilikiewicz et al. 2002, Vol. 2, p. 387), but it could also be that women were simply
more numerously represented among the patients of the four psychiatrists that cooperated
with us in the study. Either way, when discussing our results, the sex disparity may be taken
as a limitation of the study results, all the more since there is a lot of evidence that women
and men differ in their processing of language (cf. e.g., Pycia 2011: the case of Polish and
Croatian languages).
Regarding age, both twenty-year-olds and elderly people participated in our project. We
carefully selected the participants so as to ensure that each “decade” (20–29, 30–39, 40–49
years, etc.) was equally represented in each group. We also made all three groups comparable
with regard to the age of the participants. Nevertheless, age could be confusing. For instance,
if age was controlled for, we would probably obtain a different pattern of results (e.g., elderly
people could perform worse, not because of depression, but due to age-related retardation,
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i.e., a general slowing down of mental operations observed in the elderly population; see e.g.,
Brzezicka-Rotkiewicz and Se˛dek 2005).
Research Tasks for the Future
In particular, we now discuss plans for research on the cognitive representations of other
notions, projects investigating working memory efficiency and intensity of ruminative
thoughts, and work on tools for differentiating between conceptual processing in healthy
people and in those during remission from depression.
When planning research projects inspired by the present results, the first thing that springs
to mind is expanding the research area to include other notions important from the point of
view of symptoms of depression, for instance SELF, WORLD, the PRESENT, DANGER,
FATIGUE. Considering how fruitful the study on representations of the PAST, FUTURE,
JOY, SADNESS, and HAPPINESS has been, one can presume that studies on comprehension
of other notions would also yield interesting results.
It would also seem advisable to extend the tools to include a task checking the capacity of
the subjects’ working memory (e.g., an n-back task). In our study, we decided not to include
any task measuring working memory span because of the specificity of the group being
studied. People suffering from depression become tired very fast and unwillingly decide to
perform any cognitive tasks. We had severe problems with encouraging depressive patients to
take part in our study, and many of them withdrew after they saw the questionnaire they would
have to fill in. After a pilot study, we had to simplify and shorten our materials. That is why
we decided not to include any additional tasks and to rely on the broad literature confirming
the existence of the working memory deficit in depression. Our results led to the conclusion
that working memory deficits related to depression do not impair the process of metaphor
comprehension, which is automatic and effortless. However, further research is needed to
confirm this idea, such as studies investigating working memory capacity and taking into
account a larger number of diverse stimuli. For similar reasons, it would be worth including a
tool measuring the intensity of ruminative thoughts in the studied subjects (cf. e.g., Ruminative
Response Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire; Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 1991,
cited in Levens et al. 2009). An interesting idea suggested by the analysis of results of subjects
during remission of depression could be to consider the number of depressive episodes they
experienced in the past, and the significance of this variable’s influence on the obtained
results. Talarowska et al. (2009) refer to the number of earlier depressive episodes as one of
the factors influencing an individual’s cognitive function.
Another extremely interesting task for the future could be to develop a tool sensitive
to any differences in the conceptualization of notions by persons during remission from
depression, and persons without any depressive episodes in their case history. Such differences
were identified in one study conducted by our team (for a description of the method and
results, see Bartczak 2011b; Bartczak and Bokus 2013). The task did not involve creating
metaphorical and non-metaphorical conceptualizations with different valence, but assigning
semantic distances between the notions being studied (for an example of the use of a different
semantic distance latency test, see e.g., Chiao et al. 2004). The subjects were asked to treat
the notions like guests who had come to a party and to seat them (together with themselves
and two other “guests”—notions) at a round table. Based on the way the “guests” were placed
around the table, distances between the notions were assigned numerical values. This was
done as follows: The distances represented by guests X and Y sitting next to each other
were given a value of 1. If guests X and Y were separated by one “person” the value was 2,
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if two “people”—3, and if they were separated by three “people”—4. The results obtained
using this tool differentiated between all three groups of subjects, including patients during
remission from depression (see Bartczak 2011b; Bartczak and Bokus 2013). Considering the
simplicity of these kinds of tools and their easy application, they seem valuable tools to use
(after some extra studies and perhaps improvements) for diagnostic purposes, e.g., as one
of the methods monitoring the progress of therapy. It is also interesting to consider work on
the Semantic Distance Taks as a simple tool for distinguishing between groups of subjects
who are depressive, healthy, and in remission. Moreover, building a tool leading to results in
the form of a complex data set allows the ultimate analysis to be based on the increasingly
popular data mining method.
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Table 2 Sample items from the questionnaire of the metaphorical conceptualization of a notion: assessment
of valence and conventionalization
Valence
Negative Dla mnie przeszłos´c´ była cie˛z˙ka i przykra. [For me the past was tough and painful.]
(M = 1.2; SD = 0.45)
Przyszłos´c´ to utrata czucia w nogach, s´lepota i us´nie˛cie. [The future is losing sensation in
your legs, blindness, and going to sleep.] (M = 1.2; SD = 0.45)
Czasem uczucie smutku jest przytłaczaja˛ce. [Sometimes the feeling of sadness is
overwhelming.] (M = 1.2; SD = 0.45)
Positive Rados´c´ to słon´ce i kwiaty. [Joy is sunshine and flowers.] (M = 4.8; SD = 0.45)
Przyszłos´c´ moz˙e nies´c´ w sobie bardzo, bardzo dobre niespodzianki. [The future could bring
very, very nice surprises.] (M = 4.8; SD = 0.45)
Smuteczek pozwala pobyc´ chwile˛ w ciszy, posłuchac´ jak dz˙dz˙ownica ryje ziemie˛. Pozwala
skupic´ sie˛ na małostkach: na motylach, na ludziach, którzy potrzebuja˛ pomocy. . . [Sadness
enables you to sit in silence for a while, listen to an earthworm digging through the dirt. It
allows you to focus on little things: butterflies, people who need help. . .] (M = 4.2;
SD = 0.45)
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Table 2 continued
Conventionalization
Low Smutek jest takim małym stworzonkiem, które moz˙na zamkna˛c´ w dłoniach i przyjemnie
łaskocze—ma puchate futerko. [Sadness is a little creature you can hold closed in your
hands and it tickles pleasantly—it has fluffy fur.] (M = 1.2; SD = 0.45)
Szcze˛s´cie to te˛czowe ban´ki powietrza. [Happiness is rainbow-colored bubbles of air.]
(M = 1.4; SD = 0.55)
Przyszłos´c´ jest mniej kanciasta i narzucaja˛ca sie˛. [The future is less angular and overbearing.]
(M = 1.4; SD = 0.55)
High Rados´c´ to byc´ z kims´, kogo sie˛ kocha. [Joy is being with someone you love.] (M = 5; SD = 0)
Przyszłos´c´ be˛dzie taka, jaka˛ ja˛ zbudujemy sami. [The future will be how we build it
ourselves.] (M = 4.8; SD = 0.45)
Szcze˛s´cie to rodzina, z˙ona, dzieci. [Happiness is family, wife, children.] (M = 4.6;
SD = 0.55)
The values in brackets represent the judges’ average ratings and the standard deviation
Table 3 Sample items from the questionnaire of the metaphorical conceptualization of a notion: assessment
of metaphoricality
Items rated as being the least metaphorical Items rated as being the most metaphorical
PAST Przeszłos´c´ to cos´, co juz˙ mine˛ło. [The past is
something that has already gone by.]
(M = 1.82; SD = 0.90)
Przeszłos´c´ jest otwarta˛ ksie˛ga˛ pełna˛ strachu i
nieprzyjemnych wspomnien´. [The past is
an open book full of fear and unpleasant
memories.] (M = 4.25; SD = 1.05)
Przeszłos´c´ to czas, który mina˛ł. [The past is
time that has gone by.] (M = 1.90;
SD = 1.15)
Gdyby tak moz˙na było zamkna˛c´ przeszłos´c´
raz na zawsze i kłódce pozwolic´
zardzewiec´. . . [If only you could only lock
the past away once and for all and let the
padlock rust. . .] (M = 4.42; SD = 0.88)
FUTURE Przyszłos´c´ to to, co jeszcze przed nami. [The
future is whatever is still ahead of us.]
(M = 1.85; SD = 0.89).
Przyszłos´c´ jest mniej kanciasta i narzucaja˛ca
sie˛. [The future is less angular and
overbearing.] (M = 4.0; SD = 1.26)
Przyszłos´c´ jest pełna optymizmu. [The
future is filled with optimism.] (M = 2.12;
SD = 0.94)
I tak przyszłos´c´ to czarna dziura. [And so the
future is a black hole.] (M = 4.22;
SD = 1.07)
JOY Rados´c´ zawsze moz˙e sie˛ skon´czyc´. [Joy can
always end.] (M = 2.08; SD = 1.03)
Rados´c´ rozpiera dawców rados´ci, jakby
miała sie˛ wylac´ z nich. [Joy makes its
givers burst with joy, as if it were going to
pour from them.] (M = 4.2; SD = 0.91)
Mnóstwo rzeczy sprawia mi rados´c´, czyli
wywołuje us´miech na twarzy. [Lots of
things give me joy, meaning they bring a
smile to my face.] (M = 2.15; SD = 1.33)
Czasem rados´c´ bywa skrywana pod grubsza˛
warstwa˛ skóry, ochronnego
płaszcza—pancerza. [Sometimes joy is
hidden under a thicker layer of skin, a
protective coat—armor.] (M = 4.38;
SD = 0.92)
SADNESS Smutek dotyka nas, jak stracimy bliska˛
osobe˛. [Sadness touches us when we lose
someone dear.] (M = 2.12; SD = 1.24)
Mam wraz˙enie, z˙e gdyby malarz chciał
spersonalizowac´ smutek, powinien mnie
poprosic´ o pozowanie. [I have a feeling
that if a painter wanted to personalize
sadness, he should ask me to pose for him.]
(M = 3.98; SD = 1.02)
123
J Psycholinguist Res (2015) 44:159–185 181
Table 3 continued
Items rated as being the least metaphorical Items rated as being the most metaphorical
Czasem uczucie smutku jest przytłaczaja˛ce.
[Sometimes the feeling of sadness is
overwhelming.] (M = 2.22; SD = 1.07)
Smutek jest takim małym stworzonkiem,
które moz˙na zamkna˛c´ w dłoniach i
przyjemnie łaskocze—ma puchate futerko.
[Sadness is a little creature you can hold
closed in your hands and it tickles
pleasantly—it has fluffy fur.] (M = 4.6;
SD = 1.08)
HAPPINESS Szcze˛s´cie zazwyczaj krótko trwa, albo wcale
sie˛ nie zdarza. [Happiness usually lasts a
short time, or it doesn’t happen at all.]
(M = 1.8; SD = 0.99)
Szcze˛s´cie to włas´nie te ulotne ban´ki
powietrza, które pe˛kaja˛ niespodziewanie i
szybko mijaja˛. [Happiness is those fleeting
bubbles of air that burst unexpectedly and
are quickly gone.] (M = 4.45; SD = 1.08)
Szcze˛s´cie odczuwamy zawsze wtedy, kiedy
uda nam sie˛ pokonac´ trudnos´ci. [We feel
happiness whenever we manage to
overcome difficulties.] (M = 2.0;
SD = 1.09)
Szcze˛s´cie to te˛czowe ban´ki powietrza.
[Happiness is rainbow-colored bubbles of
air.] (M = 4.52; SD = 0.93)
The values in brackets represent the judges’ average ratings and the standard deviation
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